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Vertical Targeting and Leakage in Carbon Policy
By JAMES B. BUSHNELL AND ERIN T. MANSUR∗
In this paper, we examine the intersection be-
tween two important aspects of climate policy
design. The first is the point of regulation.
Should it be placed on pollution sources, carbon-
rich inputs, or consumers? This issue of up-
stream versus downstream regulation is one that
we will refer to as vertical targeting. The sec-
ond aspect concerns the external effects of a lo-
cal climate policy. Leakage occurs when partial
regulation results in an increase in emissions in
unregulated parts of the economy. This paper
examines how regulators’ choice of upstream
versus downstream environmental regulation af-
fects emissions in other countries with lax envi-
ronmental regulation.
These two elements of climate policy are
closely related. In many contexts, the selection
of the point of regulation in the vertical chain is
influenced, if not driven by, concerns over extra-
jurisdictional impacts. Given the global nature
of the pollutant, regulators in any specific juris-
diction need to be mindful of how local limits
will effect global emissions. Regions imposing
greenhouse gas restrictions may consume more
than they produce of carbon-intensive goods,
such as gasoline or cement. In such cases, reg-
ulations imposed on consumers can “reach” up-
stream to producers located outside of the regu-
lated areas. For example, by raising the cost of
consuming carbon-intensive electricity in Cali-
fornia, regulators in that state hope to reduce the
combustion of coal in other regions of the west-
ern United States.
It is important to recognize that vertical tar-
geting is but one mechanism through which
regulators can combat leakage. Much acad-
emic research and legislation has focused on
the legal and economic merits of “border ad-
justments,” such as import tariffs based upon
carbon-content, and also the “updating” of emis-
∗ Bushnell: Iowa State University and NBER, 468H Heady
Hall, Ames, IA 50011, jimb@iastate.edu. Mansur: Dartmouth
College and NBER, 6106 Rockefeller Hall, Hanover, NH 03755,
erin.mansur@dartmouth.edu. We thank Dallas Burtraw, Larry
Goulder, Chris Snyder, and participants in the 2011 AEA session
on “Critical Issues in National Climate Policy Design.”
sions credit allocations in a fashion that can sub-
sidize domestic production.1 These mechanisms
can mitigate leakage effectively, although many
legal and regulatory questions remain regard-
ing their implementation within the confines of
international trade agreements (Jeffrey Frankel,
2008) or the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Con-
stitution. Vertical targeting can be viewed as an
alternative to border adjustments that is less vul-
nerable to such conflicts.
In addition to leakage, vertical targeting has
implications for cost effectiveness, transactions
costs, and offsets. Direct regulation allows firms
to achieve the lowest compliance costs: they
may abate emissions by changing inputs, out-
put levels, or end-of-pipe technology. However,
the transactions costs of monitoring and enforc-
ing regulation for millions of cars and buildings
could dwarf the incremental benefits from direct
regulation. Upstream regulation could substan-
tially reduce these transactions costs (Gilbert
Metcalf and David Weisbach, 2009).2 David
Driesen and Amy Sinden (2009) promote Dirty
Input Limits (i.e., upstream regulation) because
of administrative costs and efficiency (being
broader in scope). Mansur (forthcoming) dis-
cusses how upstream regulation may lead to
more offsets, which have ambiguous effects on
welfare.3
1For example, Carolyn Fischer and Alan Fox (2009) com-
pare the effects on leakage of border taxes versus rebates. Mered-
ith Fowlie (2009) examines incomplete regulation with imperfect
competition, and shows how leakage may increase total emis-
sions relative to no regulation or, in other cases, may decrease
emissions relative to full regulation. Recent empirical papers on
leakage include Fowlie, Mar Reguant, and Stephen Ryan (2010)
and Bushnell and Yihsu Chen (2009). In a broader context, the
pollution havens hypothesis literature examines the interaction
between environmental regulation and international trade (Bryan
Copeland and Scott Taylor, 2004).
2In particular, the authors show that regulating a few thou-
sand fossil-fuel producing companies would account for 80 per-
cent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. By including some select
non-fossil polluters, an additional 10 percent of total emissions
would be regulated with modest transactions costs.
3In this case, regulators may offer firms credit for installing
end-of-pipe abatement technologies. These credits can partially
offset firms’ regulatory obligations. On the one hand, this may
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I. Vertical Targeting and Leakage
The interaction between vertical targeting and
leakage can be complex. First, there are several
points in the supply chain of interest, ranging
from fundamental inputs such as fossil fuels, to
the production of intermediate products such as
fertilizer or cement, to the consumption of the
final product. In some cases the act of consump-
tion can create significant emissions (e.g., gaso-
line), while in others the bulk of the emissions
are created in the production of the product (e.g.,
cement).
Further, there can be great heterogeneity in
the upstream or “life-cycle” carbon content of
some otherwise identical commodities, such as
electricity or ethanol. In such cases, regulat-
ing the downstream consumption of a product
based upon its specific upstream carbon con-
tent can create incentives to manipulate those
measurements (Benjamin Hobbs, Bushnell, and
Frank Wolak, 2010) as well as lead to the reshuf-
fling of the pairings between production sources
and consumers (Bushnell, Carla Peterman, and
Catherine Wolfram, 2008). For example, a U.S.
policy targeting purchases of oil from Canadian
bituminous (e.g., ‘tar’) sands due to its rela-
tively carbon-intensive production process could
lead to increased Canadian exports to Asia rather
than a reduction in tar-sands production.
Here we more explicitly model the various po-
tential sources of carbon emissions throughout
the supply chain. While we make some func-
tional form assumptions for tractability, we try
to capture the key elements of the problem in a
general fashion. This allows us to examine dra-
matically different circumstances ranging from
cases where the bulk of carbon emissions is far
upstream to cases where emissions primarily oc-
cur during consumption. We can also exam-
ine cases where either domestic supply or de-
mand may dominate the world market as well as
cases where domestic firms and consumers play
a small role.
II. Model
Consider two international industries that are
vertically related. These competitive markets
allow society to achieve emissions reduction goals at a lower
cost. However, offset programs may increase emissions due to
adverse selection.
are made up of four groups of firms: upstream
foreign supply, Su , upstream domestic supply,
S̃u , and the corresponding downstream supply,
Sd and S̃d , respectively. Downstream demand is
similarly composed (Dd , D̃d ), while world up-
stream demand (QDu ) is derived from the down-
stream market. For downstream and upstream
prices Pd and Pu , the equilibrium is where:
Pd = f1(Dd) = f2(D̃d) = f3(Sd) + βPu =
f4(S̃d) + β̃Pu , and Pu = f5(QDu ) = f6(Su) =
f7(S̃u). This assumes downstream firms use the
carbon-intensive input in fixed proportions, β
and β̃.
For simplicity, we assume that β, β̃, and the
emissions rates r j for source j (i.e., foreign and
domestic firms and consumers) are held fixed:
abatement is only through output decisions. Do-
mestic regulators may target any domestic en-
tity (S̃u , S̃d , D̃u , D̃d ) with corresponding carbon




u , and τ
D
d . However, as domes-
tic upstream demand is imbedded in the down-
stream supply decision, τ Du is redundant. We as-
sume that there are neither international emis-
sions policies nor boarder adjustments.
This paper asks: how does leakage, namely
foreign emissions from source j (E j ), change
with domestic policy i (∂E j/∂τ i )? With these
carbon prices, the equilibrium is:













where prices are for foreign producers and con-
sumers. We show that these policies’ effects on
leakage depend on: (1) whether the policy is
placed directly on polluters versus upstream or
downstream of them; and (2) the elasticities of
all domestic and foreign supply and demand.
To see this, consider the linear market M1, as
defined in (2), where we assume interior solu-
tions for all producers and consumers and, for
simplicity, β = β̃ = 1:4
4While a linear model may seem restrictive, consider this a
first-order Taylor approximation around an equilibrium of a more
complex system. As such, only small changes in carbon prices
are relevant. We assume all parameters are positive.
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Pd = a − bDd = ã − b̃ D̃d − τ
D
d
= c + kSd + Pu





u ) = ς + κSu
= ς̃ + κ̃ S̃u + τ
S
u .
In the appendix, we solve for the following
equilibrium prices and quantities:
Q∗ = θ4 −
(̂


















d + φ8 P
∗
u ,
where Q∗ = Q∗d = Q
∗
u and all θ i and φi are all
positive and functions of the parameters in (2).5
From this equilibrium, we can examine the
comparative statics of a carbon policy. A mar-
ginal increase in τ Su will increase P
∗
u , while the
other carbon policies will reduce it. The effects
on P∗d are more complex as the price depends
on P∗u . Here, a marginal increase in τ
S
u will in-
crease P∗d because of its effect on the upstream
market. A marginal increase in τ Dd will reduce
the P∗d because of a direct effect,−φ6, as well as





depends on the parameters: the direct effect, φ7,
is positive, but this may be offset by the effect
through the upstream market: −φ3φ8.
Three potential sources of foreign emissions
exist in this model. First, production upstream
may result in emissions, E Su = r
S
u Su . In equilib-
rium:







which are increasing in P∗u . An example of this
would be the emissions associated with produc-
ing crude oil from tar sands. Second, produc-
tion downstream may result in emissions, E Sd =
5We define x̂ = x/(x + x̃), φ1 = k̂k̃ + b̂b̃ + κ̂ κ̃ , φ2 =




/φ1, φ5 = b̃kk̃ +
bkk̃ + bb̃k̃ + bb̃k, φ6 = bkk̃/φ5, φ7 = bb̃k/φ5, φ8 =
(bb̃k̃+bb̃k)/φ5, θ1 = (ab̃+ãb)/(b+b̃), θ2 = (c̃k+c̃k)/(k+k̃),
θ3 = (ςκ̃ + ς̃κ)/(κ + κ̃), θ4 = (θ1 − θ2 − θ3) /φ1, θ5 =
κ̂ κ̃θ4 + θ3, and θ6 =
(
ab̃kk̃ + bb̃c̃k + ãbkk̃ + bb̃c̃k
)
/φ5. Pos-
itive φi follows directly from the parameters. Positive prices and
quantities imply positive θ i .
r Sd Sd :




d − c − P
∗
u )/k,
which depend on both P∗d and P
∗
u . The emis-
sions associated with refining crude oil into
gasoline is an example of this. Third, emissions
may result from downstream consumption of the
good, E Dd = r
D
d Dd :







which are decreasing in P∗d . For example, con-
sumers using gasoline to drive a car.
With this model we can demonstrate several
points. First, the application of a carbon price
on the point of the vertical chain responsible for
carbon emissions will always lead to leakage.
This is because the carbon price is applied to
domestic activities alone and necessarily stim-
ulates substitution to foreign markets. In the
case of carbon prices on production, this effect is
rather clear: all consumers substitute their pur-
chases to (now) lower cost foreign sources. In
the case of carbon prices on downstream con-
sumption the effect is indirect. The consumption
carbon price reduces world prices for the reg-
ulated product and its upstream inputs thereby
stimulating increased demand for those products
in areas without the carbon price.
PROPOSITION 1: For market M1, policies
that directly target the source of pollution in-
crease foreign emissions (result in leakage).6
Second, within our model, what we call in-
direct prices on either the upstream inputs or
downstream consumption of the product will not
lead to leakage. In fact, foreign emissions may
decrease.7 The advantage of an upstream car-
bon price in regulating downstream emissions
is that the carbon price effects input prices of
both domestic and foreign downstream prod-
ucts. For example, a Canadian tax on oil produc-
6Here is the proof of this proposition. Note that φ8 = x/(x+




























7Don Fullerton and Dan Karney (2011) also find negative
leakage in a model with two sectors competing over capital.
When one market is regulated and increases demand for capi-
tal, this has spillovers to the other market and reduces emissions
everywhere.
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tion would reduce emissions from the U.S. trans-
portation sector. Similarly, by reducing global
demand for a product, a domestic consumption
carbon price reduces upstream supply from both
foreign and domestic producers.8 Intuitively,
and as demonstrated by the model, the effective-
ness of any of these policies in terms of reducing
overall emissions, will depend upon the critical
parameters such as the elasticity of domestic and
foreign supply and demand, as well as relative
emissions rates.
PROPOSITION 2: For market M1, upstream
policies decrease downstream foreign emis-
sions, and downstream policies decrease up-
stream foreign emissions.9
PROPOSITION 3: For market M1, the magni-
tude of the effectiveness of all policies, and sign
of some, depends on the parameters of domestic
and foreign supply and demand.10
To compare policies of equal domestic effec-
tiveness, we calculate the effect of policy i on
domestic emissions at source j , ∂ Ẽ j/∂τ i . The
ratio of the marginal leakage over the marginal
reduction in domestic emissions is the same for
policies that do not directly target foreign emis-
sions, i 6= j .11 Perhaps more important is
the net effect on global emissions, ∂E j/∂τ i +
∂ Ẽ j/∂τ i , where the relative ranking of the poli-
cies depends on the parameters of the model.12
Namely, the implications of vertical targeting on
8A special case arises when the upstream product is an ex-
haustible resource. In that situation, reducing domestic demand
results in shifting consumption over time or space (Fischer and
Steven Salant, 2010).
9Using Proposition (1)’s proof, ∂E Su /∂τ
S
d




= −r Su φ2/κ , ∂E
S
d









/∂τ Su = −r
S
u φ4φ8/b are negative.
10From the proofs of Propositions (1) and (2), the mag-
nitude of the partial derivatives depend on the parame-
ters. The effect of a downstream demand policy on
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/b) depend on the parameters.










/̃k. Thus, the ratio of the mar-





k for policies that do not directly target foreign
emissions.
12For example, if all b, k, and κ parameters equal one, then
global emissions of source j decrease by (2̃r j − r j )/3 for direct
policies and by (̃r j + r j )/6 for indirect ones. Thus, if domestic
global emissions depend on the elasticities of all
market participants.
III. Discussion and Extensions
Our model shows when upstream regulation
may be preferable to downstream, and vice
versa. There is another advantage of placing
the point of regulation on the upstream input.
Namely, it is not as vulnerable to the reshuf-
fling of the relationship between specific sup-
pliers and consumers as is downstream regula-
tion on consumers. This point is not directly
addressed in this model as the taxes we exam-
ine are effectively on products, rather than emis-
sions. This is because our model does allow
for endogenous domestic and foreign emissions
rates. A tax on the consumption of “dirty” inputs
would create a domestic separation in prices be-
tween foreign and domestic inputs, while inter-
nationally the two products would trade at the
same price. In this circumstance, the “dirty” in-
puts would flow to the markets where the tax
penalty would not apply to them.
However, an upstream tax on the production
of dirty inputs would shift inward the supply
of those inputs to all markets. If the emissions
are downstream, this will unambiguously reduce
emissions, although if the emissions reside in
the production of the input itself, there will be
leakage from the “direct” effect of the regula-
tion by shifting production of the input from the
domestic market. Thus, for example a tax on
U.S. cement, while decreasing world consump-
tion of related downstream products, could in-
crease emissions by stimulating production from
less efficient Chinese facilities.
Note the potential role of border adjustments
here. If an import tariff were applied to an
upstream product in addition to a production
charge, the policy resembles a tax on consump-
tion of the upstream product, which is in turn
equivalent to a tax on downstream production in
our model. For a net importing nation, the bor-
der adjustment therefore can turn a direct policy
that creates leakage into an indirect one that re-
sults in negative leakage. However, for regions
that are net exporters, border adjustments as they
are typically conceived would not eliminate pos-
emitters have higher rates than their foreign counterparts, direct
policies will be more effective. However, if foreign emitters are
dirtier (r j > 2̃r j ), then global emissions rise with direct policies.
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itive leakage. In this case, the increase in foreign
emissions stems from reduced exports from the
regulated sector, rather than increased imports.
There are several useful extensions to be pur-
sued of even this basic model. The current
model has strong assumptions that may be re-
laxed in future work: the production function
(fixed β), emissions rate (fixed r ), linear func-
tions, competitive markets, and vertical struc-
ture. A natural extension is the imposition of
a carbon, rather than unit, tax on the various
sectors. In the absence of technology to mit-
igate emissions, such a tax would not stimu-
late cleaner production. However, when a re-
duction of emissions rates is feasible, as in the
case of switching to lower-carbon fuels, taxing
emissions rather than production or consump-
tion would have a different effect. Furthermore,
within the context of this model, such a differen-
tiated tax can capture further effects of indirect
regulations such as reshuffling.
IV. Conclusion
This paper develops a simple model to eval-
uate the effects of upstream versus downstream
regulation on leakage. Namely, if countries do
not harmonize carbon prices, then several have
voiced concern that domestic production would
be replaced by firms in unregulated or less regu-
lated nations. The implications of this paper are
that direct regulation at the point of emissions
results in leakage. However, indirect policies,
such as a carbon price on upstream supply to ad-
dress emissions from downstream consumption,
may actually reduce emissions in other coun-
tries. We find that the elasticities of demand and
supply affect the marginal effects of upstream
and downstream policies on emissions in unreg-
ulated countries.
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Mathematical Appendix
In order to solve for the market equilibrium, first set the inverse downstream world demand equal
to the inverse downstream world supply. World downstream demand is QDd ≡ Dd + D̃d = (a −




d , where x̂ = x/(x + x̃)
and θ1 = (ab̃ + ãb)/(b + b̃). World downstream supply is QSd ≡ Sd + S̃d = (Pd − c − Pu)/k +
(Pd − c̃− Pu − τ Sd )/̃k, which implies Pd = θ2 + k̂k̃Q
S
d + Pu + k̂τ
S
d , where θ2 = (c̃k + c̃k)/(k + k̃).
(When β and β̃ are not restricted to be one, then Pd = θ2 + k̂k̃QSd + (̃kβ/(k + k̃)+ k̂β̃)Pu + k̂τ
S
d .)
In equilibrium, Qd = QDd = Q
S
d and the downstream price clears both markets:
(7) θ1 − b̂b̃Qd − b̂τ
D
d = θ2 + k̂k̃Qd + Pu + k̂τ
S
d .
Given β’s of one, QDu = Qd . We can rearrange (7) to be the inverse upstream demand:







The upstream supply is QSu ≡ Su + S̃u = (Pu −ς)/κ+ (Pu − ς̃ − τ
S
u )/̃κ , which can be written Pu =
θ3 + κ̂ κ̃QSu + κ̂τ
S
u ,where θ3 = (ςκ̃ + ς̃κ)/(κ + κ̃). In equilibrium, Q







Q∗ = θ4 −
(̂


















d + φ8 P
∗
u ,




/φ1, φ5 = b̃kk̃ +
bkk̃ + bb̃k̃ + bb̃k, φ6 = bkk̃/φ5, φ7 = bb̃k/φ5, φ8 = (bb̃k̃ + bb̃k)/φ5, θ4 = (θ1 − θ2 − θ3) /φ1,
θ5 = κ̂ κ̃θ4 + θ3, and θ6 =
(
ab̃kk̃ + bb̃c̃k + ãbkk̃ + bb̃c̃k
)
/φ5.
The marginal emissions in the foreign country for each policy will differ for each type of emissions.










/κ , which are increasing in P∗u .
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Note that φ8 < 1, as we can rewrite φ8 = x/(x + v), where x and v are positive.
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We also measure the effectiveness of policies on domestic and global emissions. Note that down-




Pd − c̃ − Pu − τ Sd
)
/̃k. Thus, the ratio of the marginal leakage
over the marginal reduction in domestic emissions is r Sd k̃/̃r
S
d k for policies that do not directly target
foreign emissions. In general, the marginal effects of indirect policies on domestic agents are similar
to those on foreign agents, just with domestic emissions rates and divisors. The direct effects are:






















d (φ6 + φ2φ8 − 1)/b̃.
